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<Abstract>
The rising number of Swiss popular initiatives conflicting with international 
law reflects the decline of Swiss consensus democracy. A case in point is the 
2009 ban on the construction of minarets, which focused international attention 
on Switzerland and its direct democracy. The Constitution can be amended 
through popular initiatives that–following the collection of 100,000 signatures 
and a popular vote–put demand on the executive and the legislature to 
transcribe the constitutional popular initiative into a law. Therefore, the Swiss 
Constitution might violate international law. This conflict arose due to the 
absence of judicial review, such as a constitutional court, and the absence of 
limits to popular initiatives. Even though in 1999 jus cogens, or mandatory 
international law, was established as a criterion to invalidate popular initiatives, 
this provision has so far never been applied. The article outlines how increased 
polarization in the Swiss political system has turned the popular initiative into 
a potentially destabilizing political instrument and analyses efforts to solve the 
elusive issue of conflicts between popular sovereignty and international law.
Key words: consociational democracy, direct democracy, international law, 
judicial review, popular referendum, Switzerland
I. Introduction
In November 2009, Switzerland made headlines in the world media due to 
its long tradition of direct democracy, yet this time not in any positive manner. 
To the surprise of the Swiss official authorities, of many Swiss people, and 
the disapproval of much of the rest of the world, the Swiss electorate approved 
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the introduction of a ban on the construction of minarets (an architectural 
feature of Islamic mosques). This was possible because the Swiss system of 
direct democracy allows 100,000 Swiss citizens to put forward a‘popular 
initiative’for the‘partial revision’of the Swiss Federal Constitution.1) 
In this particular case, an initiative of politicians deriving from two right- 
wing parties–one minor and one major–demanded to outlaw the construction 
of minarets in Switzerland, and this suggestion was approved by a majority 
of 57.5 percent of the electorate on a turnout of 53.8 percent (Federal 
Chancellery, 2009). Following this vote, two complaints were submitted to the 
European Court of Human Rights by a former spokesman of the Geneva 
mosque and by four Swiss Muslim associations, respectively. However, both 
complaints were dismissed as non-admissible since the plaintiffs had not 
actually attempted to build a minaret. Subsequently, no actual case had been 
contested through the Swiss judicial system and the Court therefore declared 
that the plaintiffs‘could not claim to be the“victims”of a violation of the 
Convention’(ECtHR, 2011). 
On this occasion, Swiss authorities escaped censure by the Strasbourg 
judges; yet many strands of international public opinion were critical of 
Switzerland for arguably violating fundamental human rights concerning 
religious freedom. The Swiss minaret ban initiative highlighted to a global 
audience the potential conflict between Switzerland’s system of direct 
democracy and international law. Thus, the controversy was triggered by the 
country’s system of direct democracy, namely the right of the Swiss people 
to put forward popular initiatives that allow amending the country’s 
Constitution.2) 
1) The federal Swiss state is based on 26 cantons with 26 separate constitutional documents. 
This paper focuses exclusively on the federal Swiss state and the federal Constitution.
2) It needs to be stressed that the Swiss Federal Constitution contains detailed policy provisions 
that would belong to the scope of ordinary legislation in most other countries. The Swiss 
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In other words, this difficult situation emerged due to the lack of institutional 
mechanisms to regulate contradictions between domestic and international law 
within the Swiss political and judicial system. All articles of the Swiss 
Constitution can be amended by the people without consideration of a legal 
hierarchy between different constitutional provisions (Distefano and Mahon, 
2011). Moreover, such popular initiatives are not checked by judicial review 
of, for example, a Constitutional Court.
The Swiss federal government, termed the Federal Council of Switzerland, 
is the country’s collegial government body. It consists of seven members, 
referred to as federal councillors, that are drawn from five of Switzerland’s 
major political parties.3) Thus, the Federal Council represents the consensus- 
oriented Swiss model of democracy based on power-sharing. At the same 
time, the Swiss federal parliament, termed the Federal Assembly, consists of 
the National Council or lower house representing the Swiss people and the 
Council of States or upper house representing the 26 Swiss cantons. 
In addition to the classical power-sharing structure of the three branches, 
i.e. executive, legislative and judiciary, Swiss democracy also grants the 
people a direct say in politics through two instruments, namely popular 
referendums–briefly explained in the next section–and popular initiatives. 
Thus, the government and the parliaments are expected to write laws 
reflecting popular initiatives that have been endorsed by the Swiss people. 
The following article explores the tensions between Switzerland’s direct 
democracy, namely the popular initiative, and international law. It will highlight 
people themselves, through the popular initiative, have the power to submit demands for 
any changes of their Constitution. 
3) The five parties represented in the Swiss Federal Council are at present in order of electoral 
support the Swiss People’s Party (SVP); Social Democratic Party (SP); Free Democratic 
Party (FDP); Christian Democratic People’s Party (CVP); and Bourgeois Democratic Party 
(BDP). The political science literature refers to the Swiss case of collegial government 
of the major parties as one of the examples of consociational democracy (Lijphart 1999).
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that the‘Minaret case’was not the first time that political authorities faced 
problematic popular initiatives. On earlier occasions, such as in the case of 
the popular initiative‘For a reasonable asylum policy’, advanced by a far- 
right party in 1992, the Federal Council developed an argumentation based on 
the jus cogens (mandatory provisions of international law) and persuaded the 
Federal Assembly to invalidate this particular popular initiative in 1996, which 
therefore was not voted on by the people (Swiss Confederation, 1994).4) 
However, the notion that a mandatory provision of international law limits the 
scope of the right of popular initiatives was only added in 1999 during a 
full-scale revision of the Swiss Constitution.5)
Since the Swiss Constitution does not contain any rules regulating 
contradictory provisions between articles of the Constitution and international 
law, conflict can lead to deadlock. Thus, in the case of popular initiatives that 
are in breach of international law, the parliament would need to enact a 
domestic bill violating international law–taking the risk of being condemned 
by an international court–or it could try interpreting the popular initiative in 
a way that avoids violating international law, and in doing so would not respect 
the popular will. To put an end to this dilemma, some observers proposed to 
denounce the related article of international treaties. However, most of the 
time it is not possible to abandon specific articles, and even if stricto sensu 
4) The decision of parliament to declare a popular initiative invalid after the successful collection 
of 100,000 signatures is rarely used in the Swiss context and only four initiatives (in 1955, 
1977, 1995, and 1996) were declared invalid. In the case of the initiative “For a reasonable 
asylum policy”, it was argued that ‘[t]he Federal Council shares the conviction of the 
community of states and the new teaching that such norms in a state based on legality 
[Rechtsstaat] constitute material barriers against the revision of the constitution. For this 
reason, the initiative ‘For a reasonable asylum policy’ must be declared invalid’ (Swiss 
Confederation, 1994: 1488). 
5) Since 1874, the Swiss Federal Constitution has been partially revised many times which 
made the document less coherent. In order to address this issue, a fully revised Constitution 
was approved by the Swiss electorate in 1999. 
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the treaty in question might not belong to mandatory international law, it is 
still not possible to denounce it for political, economic, or moral reasons. 
Thus, Swiss popular initiatives that contradict international law potentially 
have a negative impact on international relations and raise the question of 
limits on people’s popular sovereignty.
II. Stating the problem
1. Special features of the Swiss polity
At the Swiss federal level, there exists no judicial review maintaining the 
continuity of the Swiss Federal Constitution. Consequently, the Swiss Federal 
Supreme Court is only allowed to review lower cantonal laws and cantonal 
constitutions, which derive from the 26 cantons that jointly constitute the 
Swiss federal state. Moreover, the constitutional Article 190, introduced in the 
1874 full-scale revision of the Constitution obliges‘the Federal Supreme 
Court and other bodies to apply federal laws, even if they are considered to 
be unconstitutional’(Rothmayr, 2001: 78–79).
In 1874 and 1891, Switzerland introduced the two main tools of its direct 
democracy, namely the popular referendum and the popular initiative,  
respectively.6) First, the referendum (mandatory or facultative) grants the 
Swiss people the power to approve or reject legislative texts such as 
constitutional provisions, national laws, or international treaties. The 
referendum is reactive and takes place after previous government action or 
parliamentary legislation. It grants the Swiss people the right to confirm or 
6) The Swiss political system is referred to as semi-direct democracy since direct and 
representative mechanisms of democracy co-exist. 
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Level of 
Legislation
Popular 
Referendum
reactive expression 
of popular will 
towards 
parliamentary 
legislation 
Popular 
Initiative
direct expression 
of popular will 
Required 
Voting 
Majorities
Federal 
Constitution  mandatory
(100,000   
signatures must 
be collected 
within 18 
months)
double   
majority 
(people and 
cantons)
Federal Law
facultative
(50,000 signatures 
within 100 days)7)
NA
simple   
majority 
(people)
reject the actions of their representatives. Second, the initiative is directly 
advanced by sections of the Swiss people and consists of a proposition to 
amend the Constitution. Thus, the initiative allows direct intervention into the 
political process by a section of the population.
<Table 1> Types of direct democracy in the Swiss polity
As outlined in table 1, Switzerland uses three types of referendum and 
initiative: (1) the mandatory referendum concerns amendments of the 
Constitution or issues such as the country’s joining of international institutions 
and requires a double majority of the people and the cantons to be approved; 
(2) the facultative referendum takes place if it is requested by at least 50,000 
7) Similarly, eight cantons can request a facultative referendum.
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citizens and can then be approved with an ordinary popular majority; and (3) 
popular initiatives for the amendment of the Swiss Constitution that are the 
focus of this article. The fourth conceivable option (compare NA in table 1), 
namely popular initiatives to allow Swiss people to amend federal laws directly, 
was introduced in 2003; yet the related constitutional article was abrogated 
again six years later for lack of use and due to controversy over its 
implementation (Hottelier, 2003: 662; Marquis, 2009).
2. The case of the popular initiative
Turning now to our case study of the popular initiative, it allows 
amendments of the Swiss Constitution (termed‘partial revision’) that are 
deriving directly from the popular will. Thus, the Swiss electorate has the 
power to amend, almost without limitations, the Federal Constitution, that is 
the basic law which regulates all other domestic laws. It can even introduce 
internally contradictory articles into the Constitution. Furthermore, it has been 
pointed out that no hierarchy exists between the constitutional provisions 
and‘a popular initiative may violate a constitutional provision already in force: 
yet both standards are indeed at the same normative level’(Marquis, 2009: 
3).8) 
The process of a popular initiative is as follows. First, initiators create a 
committee, which submits the popular initiative to the federal administration. 
Since 1978, a formal preliminary examination by the Federal Chancellery takes 
place. However, this review is restricted to procedures and formal requirements 
and the actual political content of the initiative is not reviewed (Swiss 
Confederation, 2011). If approved, the initiators of a popular initiative have 
18 months to collect at least 100,000 Swiss citizens’signatures. If successful 
at this stage, the popular initiative is logged in the Federal Chancellery and 
8) All English-language translations of French and German sources are by the authors.
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has to be validated before it is put to a vote by the Swiss people. 
For this purpose, the Federal Council first analyzes the popular initiative 
regarding its validity, and then transmits a decree to the parliament accompanied 
with a message (Federal Assembly, 2012: Article 97, 98). Second, the Federal 
Assembly, which holds the formal authority to validate an initiative, decides 
according to the constitutional provisions of Article 139, Section 3:‘If the 
initiative fails to comply with the requirements of consistency of form, and 
of subject matter, or if it infringes mandatory provisions of international law, 
the Federal Assembly shall declare it to be invalid in whole or in part’(Federal 
Constitution of the Swiss Confederation, 1999). This signifies the following: 
1. The principle of uniformity indicates that initiatives must be submitted 
either as general proposal9) or drafted in specific terms. In other words, 
an initiative cannot combine both forms. 
2. As for the subject matter, the different parts of the initiative must be 
linked by connections between issues, ensuring a degree of unity of 
objective. 
3. Finally, mandatory rules of international law are also excluded from the 
scope of the partial revision of the Constitution. If such popular initiative 
were to be put forward, they would have to be invalidated by the Federal 
Parliament.
If any of these three principles is violated, the popular initiative must be 
declared invalid (Kaufmann et al., 2005: 172). If the Federal Assembly opposes 
the initiative in question, it has the right to submit a direct counter proposal, 
which will be presented at the same time as the popular initiative to the 
people's vote. Since a 1987 procedural reform, Swiss people can cast 
9) A popular initiative submitted as a general proposal and approved in a popular vote will 
be taken up by the Federal Council and a constitutional amendment will be drafted and 
submitted to the Federal Assembly for enactment.
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a‘double yes’, i.e. they can vote yes to the popular initiative and yes to its 
parliamentary counterproposal. In such cases, a third subsidiary question is 
also provided to designate which text should be retained if both proposals 
should be approved. In case of approval, the new or amended constitutional 
article needs generally to be implemented through a federal law (Hottelier, 
2003). To that end the Federal Council elaborates a bill, which is forwarded 
to the National Council and the Council of States, where it can be accepted, 
amended, or rejected. Once upper and lower chambers have agreed on a 
common text, the bill becomes a law, which brings the popular initiative to a 
close.
Swiss citizens are invited, four times a year, to exercise their popular rights 
by casting a ballot paper on various topics brought upon by popular initiatives 
and/or referendums. Since the 1970s, the number of voting issues has grown, 
while people’s participation has dropped and now usually remains below 50 
per cent on average. Higher numbers of initiatives potentially also increase 
the number of problematic ones, such as in the case of clashes with international 
law.
In this context, the 1999 full-scale revision of the Federal Constitution 
introduced a new condition for the validity of popular initiatives based on 
imperative international law (Article 139). However, the Federal Council has 
subsequently followed a narrow interpretation of this criterion and has never 
suggested invalidating popular initiatives on account of conflicts with imperative 
international law, and the Federal Assembly has continuously decided in line 
with these recommendations (Marquis, 2009: 7).
3. Primacy of international law over national law
Two traditions exist in the relationship between national and international 
law, namely the monistic and the dualist tradition. The monistic tradition, as 
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present in the case of Switzerland, is based on the assumption of a single legal 
order in which international law is part of the domestic legal system. Thus, 
international law is automatically incorporated, takes immediate effect, and no 
new implementing law is required. In the hierarchy of monistic systems, 
international law is therefore generally granted a higher normative status in 
comparison to domestic law.
On the other hand, the dualist tradition, as present in the case of Germany, 
holds that international law coexists with national law and does not enjoy 
primacy. It therefore requires a domestic law to make the international law 
applicable. Once the international law has been transformed and incorporated 
into domestic law, it has the same status than other domestic laws. 
According to the Federal Council, Switzerland belongs to the monistic 
tradition (Swiss Confederation, 2010: 2264). This tradition is characterized 
by the acceptance of international law which recognizes internally the 
immediate validity of international law and its direct applicability as long as 
it is‘accurate enough to serve as the base for a decision in a concrete case’ 
(ibid.). In principle, international law takes precedent over Swiss law (ibid.) 
and Article 5, Section 4 of the Swiss Constitution holds that the Confederation 
and the Cantons–in other words, all state organs–must respect international 
law and apply it internally.
The Federal Council states that the relationship between international law 
and Swiss national law depends on three elements, namely (1) validity, (2) 
applicability, and (3) hierarchy of norms. As for validity, this concerns the 
issue of whether or not an international law immediately acquires the force 
of law within the State. As for applicability, this concerns the question of 
whether or not the court can directly apply international law or requires 
clarification on its applicability through a domestic law. 
As for the problem of hierarchy, this concerns the issue of conflicting 
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national and international legal norms and which of them shall prevail (ibid.: 
2284). Crucially, the Federal Constitution contains no explicit provisions 
offering guidance in case of conflict between national laws and/or the 
Constitution, on the one hand, and international law on the other hand. If 
constitutional provisions contradict international conventions, there is no rule 
requiring that international law takes precedence in all cases or, conversely, 
that the constitutional provision takes precedence in all cases (ibid.: 2308).
4. Jus cogens v. jus dispositivum
The concept of jus cogens can be traced back to the Roman law, which 
relates to the jus strictum or mandatory law, as opposed to jus dispositivum, 
which only results from the will of the parties. Jus cogens was formally 
codified in 1969 through the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and 
is defined in its Articles 53 and 64. The term jus cogens refers to a preeminent 
norm of general international law, which is‘accepted and recognized by the 
international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no 
derogation is permitted’(United Nations, 2005: 18). It is therefore a provision 
so fundamental to the ratifying states in the international system that no 
violation could be accepted. Moreover, Article 53 specifies that a treaty is void 
if, at the time of its agreement, it conflicts with the jus cogens.
There exists no official exhaustive list of jus cogens, which demonstrates 
its dynamic nature (Burri et al., 2011: 24). However, the International Law 
Commission (ILC) and the International Court of Justice (ICJ) have described 
some examples: prohibition of the use of force, genocide, slavery, torture, and 
racial discrimination. The Federal Council includes the mandatory provisions 
of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)10) in the jus cogens, 
10) The European Convention on Human Rights is abbreviated in the literature as ECHR, while 
the abbreviation used to refer to the European Court of Human Rights is ECtHR.
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but considers the UN International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR) and the UN International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR) only as non-breakable, but not as part of the jus cogens. 
Customary law and general principles of law are equally non-breakable (Swiss 
Confederation, 2011: 2314).11) 
Legal doctrine scholars recently started to designate these UN treaties along 
with more technical or economic ones, like bilateral agreements with the EU 
and WTO agreements, as de facto mandatory international law, distinguishing 
them from the conventional international law (Federal Chancellery, 2012: 65). 
Following a strict interpretation of the jus cogens, they do not belong to that 
higher priority type but they are nevertheless formally not breakable:‘De facto 
mandatory international law exists whenever the international responsibility 
of offences against international law or the termination of state treaties would 
trigger such far-reaching results for Switzerland that the intentions of the 
popular initiative would be comparatively of little relevance’(Schefer and 
Zimmermann, 2011: 354). 
Since the 1990s,‘more and more popular initiatives are not clashing with 
international mandatory laws (jus cogens) but with other international law that 
cannot always be terminated or in which termination is difficult to conceive 
for political reasons’(Swiss Confederation, 2011: 3632). It has been pointed 
out that out of‘18 adopted popular initiatives since 1893, alone six were 
accepted in the last nine years, and four of these must be considered as 
problematic regarding the rule of law’(Burri et al., 2011: 58). It is often 
difficult to predict the people’s vote because the Swiss people, as the 
sovereign, are not accountable to any higher authority and are entitled to take 
contradictory decisions at different points in time. 
Thus, the Federal Council stated that‘in the case of popular initiatives that 
11) Although customary law is less codified in the international context, it carries the same 
weight as other types of law.
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contradict only non-mandatory international law, the initiative must be declared 
valid and voted on by the people and the cantons’(Swiss Confederation, 2010: 
2316). Instead of solving the conflict at the level of the review of the validity 
of the popular initiative, i.e. prior to the vote casting, conflicts are therefore 
shifted to the Federal Council and ultimately to the legislature and the 
implementation stage. The same report states further that‘[i]f implementation 
complying with international law is not possible, the Ultima Ratio of termination 
of an international treaty has to be considered’(Swiss Confederation, 2010: 
2317).
It has been asserted that the Swiss people‘fall hostage to political groups 
for which the right of initiative is no longer an entitlement to submit a society 
project [projet de société], but only serves to engage in polemics without any 
concern for practical implementation of the project’(Marquis, 2009: 14). 
Consequently, it has been suggested that citizens should not be requested to 
vote on a popular initiative which cannot produce tangible effect because it 
violates general international law (Burri et al., 2011).
For the Federal Council,‘such contradictions must be avoided in order not 
to place Switzerland in a position to either break its international legal 
commitments or to be unable to apply constitutional law in force’(Swiss 
Confederation, 2011: 3620). Werro and Viret (2007: 235) argue that the 
precedence of international law in the absence of judicial review produces a 
distortion in the protection of individual fundamental rights. Rights relating to 
the provisions of the ECHR are better protected as compared to those which 
are only enshrined in the Swiss Constitution. Federal Supreme Court judges 
have no choice but to apply the federal statute, even if it violates individual 
constitutional rights. But if the same individual rights are also mentioned in 
an international convention such as the ECHR, the judges would apply not the 
federal law but the provisions of the ECHR, in line with current federal 
jurisprudence (Vatter, 2014: 500). One way of avoiding the creation of two 
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categories of constitutional rights would be the implementation of judicial 
review in Switzerland.
5. The absence of judicial review in the Swiss case
De Andrade (2001: 978) holds that there are three ways of determining 
the constitutionality of enacted legislation. First, there is political review in 
which a political body holds absolute legislative supremacy and the courts are 
excluded from the process, such as in the case of the Netherlands and the 
United Kingdom. Second, there is judicial review which takes place when‘a 
court is empowered to set aside statutes conflicting with the constitution’, such 
as in the case of Germany and the United States (ibid.; see also Lijphart, 1999: 
ch. 12). Third, there exists a mixed system of review in the Swiss case in 
which legislature and judiciary are each entitled to review different bodies of 
legislation. In particular, Swiss federal laws can be reviewed only through the 
political process, while cantonal laws and cantonal constitutions–located 
below the federal level–can be reviewed by the Federal Supreme Court (ibid., 
further references omitted).
De Andrade further suggests that western countries have‘developed two 
main forms of judicial review: the American common law system and the 
continental European civil law system’(2001: 979). The American system of 
review, also called decentralized or diffuse model, is located in the judicial 
system as a whole and there exists no specific court or tribunal with 
monopolistic jurisdiction. On the other hand, the European or centralized 
model‘is characterized by the existence of a special court, with exclusive or 
close exclusive jurisdiction over constitutional rulings’(Stone Sweet, 2003: 
2769-2770). Another difference is that the American system allows the 
constitutionality of a statute to be examined when a legal dispute exists, while 
the European system of judicial review allows determining the compatibility 
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of a statute with the constitution in the abstract even in the absence of a 
concrete case (de Andrade, 2001: 983).
In addition, a distinction between weak and strong forms of judicial review 
can be drawn. It has been pointed out that U.S. judicial review represents a 
strong system, where interpretive judgments from the higher courts are‘final 
and unrevisable by ordinary legislative majorities’(Tushnet, 2008: 33) and 
‘[t]he people have little recourse when the courts interpret the Constitution…’ 
(ibid.: 22). On the other hand, weak forms of judicial review allow the political 
authorities to revise the judges’interpretation of constitutional articles without 
the need to use special majority legislative processes (Lijphart, 1999: 220). 
Zhai (2009) explains the absence of judicial review in Switzerland at the 
federal level with the Swiss direct democracy, and there exists a notion that 
it is the people themselves who exercise constitutional review. A second reason 
for Zhai (ibid.)  is strong cantonal identity and decentralized loyalty. 
Lastly, the existence of a flexible federal constitution might be another 
factor,‘[u]nlike the United States, then, Switzerland is not governed by its 
constitution; its constitution reflects how it is governed’(Steinberg, 1988: 
16-17). Thus, in the Swiss example of consociational democracy, the people 
have the last word in the absence of a judicial review at the federal level. Any 
amendment to the Constitution requires the double majority of the people and 
the cantons as stated in Article 142 of the Swiss Federal Constitution.
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III. Searching for solutions
1. Recent failed attempts to introduce judicial review 
in Switzerland
In 1996, the Federal Assembly made an effort to include the concrete 
review of federal laws by the Swiss Federal Supreme Court within the reform 
of the Swiss judicial system (Rothmayr, 2001). However, no agreement 
between the two chambers of the Federal Assembly could be found, and 
judicial review was subsequently removed from the package of judicial reform. 
Vatter (2008: 17) concludes that the Federal Assembly withdrew the proposal 
due to the fact that‘a constitutional court system [was] seen as a restriction 
of direct democratic popular sovereignty’.
The issue of judicial review was raised once more when two parliamentary 
initiatives were submitted by Müller-Hemmi/SP (2007)12) and Studer/EVP 
(2005)13) in the National Council (lower chamber) of the federal parliament. 
These initiatives resulted in a second legislative effort to adopt a federal judicial 
review (Swiss Confederation, 2010: 2265). The Committees for Legal Affairs 
of the National Council and Council of States respectively debated the two 
parliamentary initiatives and subsequently requested the Swiss government for 
a formal draft on constitutional amendment.14) After some delay, this 
governmental draft on judicial review was agreed by the National Council and 
forwarded to the Council of States (upper chamber).
12) Social Democratic Party of Switzerland, accessible at: http://www.parlament.ch/d/suche/
seiten/geschaefte.aspx?gesch_id=20070476.
13) Evangelical People's Party, accessible at: http://www.parlament.ch/d/suche/seiten/geschaefte. 
aspx?gesch_id=20050445.
14) In Switzerland, both chambers of parliament enjoy equal powers and have an identical 
committee structure. Failure of both chambers to agree on a legislative proposal means 
that the proposal has failed.
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This time around, a majority favoured a diffuse and weak model of judicial 
review. In this model, no specific court is entitled to review the constitutionality 
of federal laws. Instead, any judge could check the compatibility of laws with 
the Federal Constitution before applying them. Crucially, this model of judicial 
review would have let the constitutional Article 139 untouched, which relates 
to the validity of popular initiatives. Moreover, courts would not be able to 
make a statute disappear from the legal order. This right would still be 
exclusively retained by the parliament in case of federal laws and by the people 
and the cantons in the case of constitutional provisions. 
The supporters of judicial review in the upper chamber put forward 
arguments pointing to the enhancement of the rule of law. For example, 
Savary/SP highlighted the anomaly that the judges of the European Court of 
Human Rights in Strasbourg exercise currently more power than Swiss judges 
on verifying Swiss laws (ATS, 2012). Since there is currently no judicial review 
in Switzerland, potential victims of violations of Human Rights, mentioned in 
the European Convention of Human Rights, can file a complaint to the European 
Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. Rulings of the European judges have 
a binding effect and the judges of the Federal Supreme Court must therefore 
follow the decision of the European Court of Human Rights, which can be said 
to perform‘a role of quasi-constitutional court of Switzerland’(Zhai, 2009: 
20).
Opponents of the reform in the upper chamber argued that a potential 
politicization of judges could weaken direct democracy. For example, Jenny/ 
SVP claimed that a decision made by the Swiss people through a referendum 
could be ignored by judges because they no longer have the obligation to strictly 
apply the law (Swiss Parliament, 2012: 443). Moreover, it was argued that 
judges might endanger social protection laws. For instance, Rechsteiner/SP was 
reluctant to entrust federal and cantonal courts with issues such as maintaining 
public services or the retirement age of women. He pointed to the gate keeper 
The conflict between direct democracy and international law: 21
function of the US Supreme Court in the case of Obama’s health care reform 
as a negative example (ATS, 2012). Finally, it was argued that direct 
democracy institutions had become a core part of the Swiss identity that was 
now untouchable for a majority of the people (Marquis, 2009). In conclusion, 
the opponents of judicial review argued for the principle of the‘supremacy 
of parliament and the people’(Rothmayr, 2001: 82).
The latest attempt to introduce judicial review in Switzerland failed on June 
5, 2012 when the Council of States overruled the recommendation of its own 
Committee for Legal Affairs, and decided with a 63 per cent majority of votes 
against the abrogation of Article 190 of the Constitution, which states in the 
(non-official) English-language translation that‘[t]he Federal Supreme 
Court and the other judicial authorities apply the federal acts and international 
law’(Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confederation, 1999). This article 
implies that judges must always apply the law, even if they believe it to be 
in conflict with the constitution and international law.
Crucially, abrogating Article 190 would have allowed any cantonal and 
federal judge to verify the conformity of a federal law with the Constitution. 
Therefore, this would have introduced the right to conduct judicial reviews of 
a federal law (Masmejan, 2012; Rouiller, 2012). The parliamentary initiatives 
were returned to the National Council, which in a second round of debates took 
on board the position of the upper chamber reversing its earlier position. Thus, 
in December 2012 the proposal was ultimately withdrawn, which ended the 
prospects for the introduction of judicial review of federal legislation in 
Switzerland for the time being.
2. The absence of judicial review and consensus 
democracy
For Arend Lijphart, one of the leading commentators on Swiss consociational 
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democracy, a major analytical distinction exists between a consensus model 
of policy-making and the pure majoritarian system (1999: ch. 3). The former 
is generally based on a rigid constitution that is protected by judicial review 
and the need to mobilize supermajorities in parliament to conduct constitutional 
amendments. The latter case is generally characterised by a flexible 
constitution and the absence of judicial review or the requirement to gain 
supermajorities in parliament (ibid.: 216). It is therefore important to stress 
that Switzerland, as a paradigm case of the consensus model of democracy, 
differs from other cases on two accounts.
First, parliament has the right to amend the Swiss Constitution acting with 
a simple majority rather than a qualified majority. Yet this right of decision- 
making of parliament on changes of the Constitution is subject to the 
‘mandatory referendum’and requires a double majority of the people and the 
26 cantons in order to approve it (see Table 1). It can therefore be argued 
that Lijphart’s condition of a‘qualified’majority does apply in the sense that 
it is shifted from the parliamentary level to the Swiss electorate. 
Second, Lijphart stresses that the absence of judicial review, defined as 
‘the power to test the constitutionality of laws passed by the national 
legislature’(1999: 223), is in the Swiss case‘the only majoritarian feature 
in an otherwise solidly consensual democracy’(ibid.: 230). Yet this absence 
of judicial review at the federal level is only one of the dimensions of the Swiss 
legal system while other features follow the model of consensus democracy. 
For example, the composition of the Swiss Federal Supreme Court reflects the 
political composition of parliament, with all the judges being selected according 
to their political party affiliation–and also according to geographical, linguistic, 
and professional criteria (Vatter, 2014: 488-95; Federal Supreme Court, 
2012).
Until the early 1990s, the Federal Supreme Court could have been considered 
without any power other than the application of the federal law, due to Article 
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190 of the Federal Constitution, which excludes the review of federal laws. 
However, since 1991‘the Federal Supreme Court has been willing to examine 
the conformity of federal laws with the ECHR and the judgements of the ECtHR. 
With regard to some fundamental rights, constitutional review has thus de facto 
been extended to federal laws without a fundamental amendment of the 
constitution’(Kälin, 2004: 184).
As a result, the Federal Supreme Court changed its jurisprudence due to 
the human rights guaranteed by the ECHR, which largely overlap with the ones 
already contained in the Federal Constitution (ibid.). The Federal Supreme 
Court has been‘creative and not strictly following an interpretative model’ 
(Rothmayr, 2001: 85), and judicial court activism on fundamental rights 
subsequently influenced the expanded list of basic rights in the fully overhauled 
Swiss Federal Constitution of 1999. 
If diffuse judicial review would have been adopted by abrogation of Article 
190 of the Federal Constitution, judges would have gained authority to review 
the constitutionality of any internal law. However, the Swiss electorate would 
still have enjoyed the power to amend the Constitution at any point in time, 
without preliminary scrutiny from a legal body. Therefore, Switzerland would 
have remained a country with weak barriers against amending the Constitution 
and without clear rules avoiding potential conflict between popular democracy 
and international law.
4. Recent debates on the conflict between popular 
initiatives and international law
A large number of Swiss policy-making actors such as individual 
parliamentarians, political parties, the Political Institutions Committees of the 
lower and upper chamber of parliament, and civil society activists have 
advanced contradicting ideas on how to deal with potential and actual conflicts 
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between popular initiatives and international law (Burri et al., 2011, footnote 
7-9; Solothurner Landhausversammlung, 2010; Fontana and Hofmann, 2015). 
The Federal Council of Switzerland suggested adding a second section to 
Article 190 of the Constitution, which would allow Swiss courts to not apply 
federal laws or provisions of the federal constitution, if these are in conflict 
with mandatory international law or international law previously endorsed by 
a popular referendum. In addition, federal laws would also not be applied when 
international courts ruled that they offended against international law (Swiss 
Confederation, 2010: 2325). 
The Federal Council also considered four options to extend the motives of 
invalidation of popular initiatives, namely:
1. to create additional barriers against initiatives that violate international 
laws of vital importance for Switzerland.
2. to introduce international human rights guarantees as a new and/or 
additional criteria to validate popular initiatives.
3. to establish a list of significant international rules or treaties as a 
general barrier against constitutional amendments.
4. to introduce the criteria of legal or political inapplicability [Undurchführbarkeit] 
of popular initiatives, due to offences against international law, as a new reason 
for invalidation (Swiss Confederation, 2011: 3640). 
However, it was concluded that establishing stricter limits on the validity 
of popular initiatives would generate new legal and political problems since 
each of the considered options was difficult to apply in practice. For example, 
defining which international legal provision could be said to be of vital 
importance to Switzerland or issues relating to the legal and political 
inapplicability of constitutional provisions would still remain matters of political 
judgment [Ermessen]. Last but not least, the current Swiss Constitution 
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demands that political decisions on constitutional changes are due to the people 
and the cantons rather than the Federal Assembly in the context of deciding 
about the validation of popular initiatives (ibid.).
More recently, the Political Institutions Committees of the two chambers 
requested the federal government to report on potential solutions to the 
problem of conflicts between direct democracy and international law. On 
February 19, 2014, the government advanced two proposals: first, to provide 
non-binding judicial recommendations to the initiators of popular initiatives 
concerning the compatibility of their proposals with international law and 
fundamental rights; second, to put forward new criteria to invalidate popular 
initiatives in case of the violation of the core of constitutional fundamental 
rights, However, the government realized after consultations that consensus 
was lacking and support was weak and therefore recommended dismissal of 
its own proposals to parliament (Swiss Confederation, 2014).
On June 22, 2014, new controversy arose when the media disclosed the 
existence of a‘secret’reflection group named‘Democrazia Vivainta’, which 
had been set up by the Federal Chancellery–the administrative body serving 
the Federal Council–to work on the reform of popular initiatives from a political 
rights perspective (Huber, 2014).15) While the reflection group, drawn from 
a narrow sample of the government bureaucracy, academia and business, had 
previously received a formal mandate from the Federal Council in connection 
with the publication of the February 19, 2014 report, this had been unknown 
to the general public. In fact, the existence of the reflection group proved to 
be a surprise even for some political insiders in bodies such as the Political 
Institutions Committees. The SVP president Toni Brunner, for example, reacted 
with harsh criticism claiming that‘Federal Bern has become extremely 
15) The chief of staff of the Federal Chancellery is elected in parallel with the members of 
the Federal Council by the Federal Assembly. The Chancellery assists both Federal Council 
and Federal Assembly but reports only to the Federal Council.
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non-transparent’ (Kohler, 2014).
Meanwhile, popular initiatives being submitted to the Swiss popular vote have 
raised new questions beyond the scope of the conflict between direct 
democracy and international law. Two such initiatives, both introduced by the 
right-wing populist SVP, have recently been accepted by the Swiss population, 
namely the initiative‘For the deportation of criminal foreigners’on November 
28, 2010 and‘Against mass immigration’on February 9, 2014. The former 
case questions fundamental principles of the legal system, such as the 
proportionality principle in the punishment of crimes–since even minor 
offences of foreigners are supposed to result in automatic deportation–as well 
as the discretionary power of judges. In the latter case, already implemented 
bilateral agreements between Switzerland and the European Union about the 
free mobility of workers are questioned (Gemperli, 2015).
Unlike the ban on the construction of minarets, these two initiatives have 
profound impact on the executive and legislative powers since the Federal 
Council is now forced to formulate legislation, which either contradicts 
international law or questions bilateral treaties. Thus, the Federal Assembly, 
being the authority that would have the power to invalidate popular initiatives, 
is increasingly confronted with problematic popular initiatives with regard to 
international law and judicial principles. 
Between 1996 and the spring of 2014, the Federal Assembly consistently 
followed recommendations of the Federal Council and did not invalidate any 
popular initiative that had collected the necessary signatures. Therefore, all 
were forwarded to the stage of the popular vote. Yet the Federal Assembly 
recently showed less unanimity when it came to the post-initiative stage of 
transforming constitutional popular initiatives into federal laws. An important 
development in this context is the ongoing conflict about the implementation 
of the SVP initiative‘For the deportation of criminal foreigners’that was 
approved by a majority of 52.3 percent of the Swiss electorate on November 
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28, 2010. The initiative demanded that foreigners committing certain categories 
of crimes in Switzerland should be automatically deported. From the point of 
view of proportional justice, with regard to the discretionary power of judges, 
and due to conflict with international law, the initiative was rejected by the 
other main political parties. 
After two years of post-initiative debate about scenarios for implementation, 
the SVP blamed the government for endless delaying tactics and launched a 
second popular initiative, called‘implementation initiative’, which was submitted 
with the necessary number of signatures in December 2012. Significantly, this 
second initiative was intended to put pressure on parliament to speed up 
deliberations and to implement the original initiative. In fact, this was without 
precedent in Swiss political history and amounted to a new tactic of using the 
popular initiative to force the hand of parliament while the legislative process 
was still ongoing.
Meanwhile, in summer 2013, the Federal Council submitted a middle-way 
proposal, which avoided the automatic deportations of foreign criminal offenders 
and took into account the principle of proportional justice. However, subsequent 
debate about whether to follow the original SVP proposal of automatic 
deportation, among other conflicting points, or the more moderate Federal 
Council proposal highlighted the deep divisions within the Swiss political class 
between the political parties, the two branches of parliament and within the 
committees of each branch.16) Ultimately, the mainstream centre-right parties 
gave up their previous resistance in the National Council under threat of the 
second SVP initiative and the lower chamber decided to implement the 2010 
SVP initiative‘For the deportation of criminal foreigners’in March 2014.17)  
16) There was disagreement in the National Council between the Committee for Legal Affairs, 
which supported the government’s ‘middle road’ proposal, while the Political Institutions 
Committee accepted the SVP position.
17) According to Verena Diener, the head of the Political Institutions Committee of the Council 
of States, the scenario accepted by the National Council would result in the annual deportation 
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On the other hand, the Political Institutions Committee of the Council of 
States–the chamber in which SVP representation is lower–continued to 
oppose the decision of the National Council. Instead, the upper chamber 
elaborated on an alternative bill, which took into account the principle 
of‘non-refoulement’, i.e. the outlawing of the deportation of foreigners to 
countries where they might face torture. Moreover, issues such as the rule 
of law in state actions, the proportionality of law and fundamental rights, such 
as mentioned in Articles 29 and 30 of the Swiss Constitution and the Articles 
8, 11 and 13 of the ECHR were also considered. The alternative bill of the 
upper chamber was approved during the 2014 winter parliamentary session 
and has since also been agreed by the lower chamber during the 2015 spring 
parliamentary session. However, the initial disagreement between the two 
chambers of parliament underlined the disruptive potential of popular 
initiatives to put the existing framework of Swiss policy-making into deadlock.
IV. Conclusion
In the context of Swiss direct democracy, the popular initiative has served 
to allow groups outside of the mainstream of the Swiss political system to 
make their voices heard and to directly or indirectly influence policies. In the 
past, direct democracy allowed for the step-by-step extension of the Swiss 
system of consociational democracy by putting pressure on the elites to 
of 9,000 foreign offenders while the original 2010 SVP initiative would trigger a somewhat 
lower number of deportations. Diener also stressed that the second ‘implementation 
initiative’ of the SVP – if forwarded to a popular vote and accepted in a referendum – 
would result in an even higher figure of around 18,000 annual deportations of foreign 
offenders from Switzerland (Burkhardt, 2014).
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consider new demands and issues and to avoid blockages (Church and Vatter, 
2009: 414). This triggered the opening of government to new forces and 
helped to negotiate and partially overcome divisions in Swiss society, such as 
the religious, linguistic, regional, socio-economic and left-right cleavages. 
Thus, the existence of channels for a direct popular voice–in the popular 
initiative–helped to unite the major political actors into the consensual system 
of government that is still in place today. 
However, this logic of direct democracy as one of the driving forces of 
political participation and integration has now stopped working due to changes 
elsewhere in the Swiss political system. The two most significant 
developments since the 1990s are changes in the party system and increased 
Europeanization and internationalization of domestic policy-making (Sciarini, 
2014). As for the former, a shift from moderate pluralism toward polarized 
pluralism in the Swiss party system can be observed. This shift is at least 
partially due to the earlier weakening of corporatist structures in the Swiss 
polity since the 1970s in line with other continental European countries. At 
the level of the party system, this has been mostly–but not exclusively–
caused by the political transformation of the SVP which has increasingly 
adopted populist right-wing positions.
In 2007, the SVP even considered leaving the Federal Council and to enter 
opposition–a step that would have ended the existing practice of power– 
sharing that has been in place in its current form since 1959. In turn, leftist 
and centrist forces have more recently positioned themselves against the SVP 
questioning the democratic credentials of the party and arguing in favour of 
mechanisms to limit the influence of the SVP on policy-making (Zeller, 2014).
In parallel, Swiss policy-making has become less insulated and is increasingly 
subject to pressures deriving from Europeanization and internationalization. 
Mandatory international law and less imperative international treaties, such as 
the Schengen agreement as part of the bilateral treaties with the EU, have 
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reduced the domain of domestic policy-making. This has resulted in a deepening 
of cleavages between those who accept the political logic deriving from 
international agreements and international law, and others who insist on 
constitutional freedom in the decision-making processes of direct democracy. 
One might ask, therefore, whether absence of limits to popular initiatives in 
the current Swiss Constitution might produce threats for other institutions of 
Swiss democracy.
The quasi absence of limits to popular initiatives has certainly encouraged 
initiators’audacity and boldness of their sponsors. For example, the 2010 
initiative‘For the deportation of criminal foreigners’arguably questions the 
rule of law, principles of justice and fundamental human rights. This particular 
SVP initiative was in turn backed up by a second‘implementation initiative’, 
also submitted by the SVP in 2012, and is currently pending. It challenges 
basic democratic principle such as the separation of powers by putting 
pressure on parliament to force its hand on deliberations.
Reacting to these developments, the Council of States tackled the issue of 
conflicts between popular initiatives, international law and other conflicting 
democratic and legal principles in its 2014 summer parliamentary session by 
requesting an overall analysis of the problem. Rather than validating each 
initiative for itself, as had been the case since the last invalidation in 1996, 
the Political Institutions Committee chairwoman, Verena Diener, voiced concern 
about the current state of Swiss popular initiatives:‘Each initiative that we 
simply rubber-stamp creates precedents. Upcoming initiatives will be 
“bolder”still. Every time, earlier initiatives are suddenly instrumentalized to 
formulate legal texts (…) or to provide for retroactive effects over a number 
of years–creativity does not encounter limits anymore’(Swiss Parliament, 
2014: 414).
This recent more critical attitude of the Council of States concerns conflicts 
between popular initiatives and international law–the focus of the current 
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article–and other problems such as clashes with internal Swiss standards 
contained in the constitution, with basic principles of law, and regarding the 
separation of powers. These conflicts emerge from the inbuilt tension between 
the liberal democratic or Madisonian state with its focus on the rule of law 
and fundamental rights, on the one hand, and the republican democratic or 
Rousseauian state with its focus on the direct and unmediated decision- 
making power of the people. Liberal and republican principles of democracy 
can feed each other–but they can equally oppose each other.
These problematic features of Swiss direct democracy have been in place 
for a long time, and resulting tensions were ingrained in the Swiss 
constitutional system since the popular initiative was introduced in 1891. 
However, conflicts became more acutely visible during the first decade of the 
21th century and caught the attention of international audiences with the 2009 
initiative that introduced the ban on the construction of minarets into the Swiss 
Constitution. This popular initiative demonstrated how the application of Swiss 
direct democracy and the parallel expansion of international law protecting 
fundamental rights can result in conflicting situations and illustrates the 
potential opposition between liberal and republican statehood.
Switzerland has always been cautious regarding innovations coming from 
outside, considering itself for a long time a Sonderfall and only prudently 
joining international organizations or treaties. Developments since the 1992 
rejection in a referendum of European Economic Area membership underlined 
that neither a shift toward full-scale EU integration nor a return towards 
isolation was feasible. Indeed, bilateral agreements between Switzerland and 
the EU were the compromise reached in reaction to the 1992 decision. The 
search for a viable solution to the conflict between domestic direct democracy 
and the larger international legal and normative environment, as suggested by 
the Council of States, could give rise to further polarization of the Swiss polity. 
Establishing a Constitutional Court along the lines of the centralized European 
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model and granting it the power to review popular initiatives before their 
submission to a popular vote could have provided a definitive solution to 
problematic cases of popular initiatives that are in conflict with de facto 
mandatory international law. Although the judicial review of popular referendums 
along the lines of a diffuse and decentralized model was considered in the Swiss 
political debate between 2011 and 2012, the two chambers of parliament have 
ultimately refused it. Thus, the political powers, legislative and executive, 
continue to claim parliamentary supremacy over the judiciary.
Although conflicts between direct democracy and international law are of 
the greatest concern, many other issues relating to domestic fundamental 
rights or basic constitutional principles also require solutions. Moreover, the 
possibility of unlimited post-hoc initiatives can always threaten the long-term 
plans and policies of the federal government. Thus, Swiss policy-makers may 
have to explore direct political steps to reform the popular initiative with the 
view to defend their ability to deliberate and to act (Cassidy, 2014).
In summary, consensus democracy in Switzerland has declined to a 
significant extent. The political system is now more polarized and the long- 
standing collegial federal government, that includes the SVP, is sometimes 
questioned. Opposition between liberal and republican features of democracy 
has become much more visible due to the decision on the part of political 
parties in the Federal Council–particularly on the part of the SVP–to use the 
popular initiative in a much more unrestrained manner to push forward their 
political agendas, even if such agendas are in conflict with national or 
international established norms.
This leaves one to conclude that the decline of consociational democracy 
in Western Europe, similar to earlier developments in the Belgian and Dutch 
cases, has also arrived in Switzerland. It is certainly too early to conclude that 
Swiss consociationalism is beyond repair (Vatter and Stadelmann-Steffen, 
2013). Yet observers of Swiss affairs might have to focus less on the 
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continuing existence of institutions of consensus democracy and shift their 
attention more to the actual use of these elements. Thus, the way in which 
political actors in Switzerland address the conflict between direct democracy 
and the larger system of international legal and normative obligations might 
indicate whether or not Swiss consociationalism has a lasting future.
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직접민주주의와 국제법 간의 갈등: 
스위스의 사례 분석
Jörg Michael Dostal*
Marc Champod**
<국문초록>
국제법과 갈등관계에 놓일 수 있는 스위스 국민운동의 증가는 스위스의 합의민주주
의 시스템의 위기를 암시하고 있다. 2009년 국민운동을 통해 첨탑건립을 금지시킨 
사례는 스위스와 스위스의 직접 민주주의에 대해 국제적인 이목을 집중시켰다. 국민운
동, 즉 10만 명의 서명과 국민투표 실시를 통해 스위스 헌법은 바꿀 수가 있다. 행정부
와 입법부는 국민운동의 요구를 법률로 실현시켜야 한다. 
이러한 이유로 스위스 헌법의 결정이 국제법과 갈등상황에 놓일 수가 있는 것이다. 
이러한 갈등은 헌법재판소의 법률적인 검토에 있어서의 실수나 국민운동의 내용에 대
한 제한의 부재를 통해서 나타난다. 1999년의 jus cogens 고려, 즉 강제적인 국민법의 
고려를 국민운동의 무효요건으로 도입했음에도 불구하고, 이 규정은 현재까지 한번도 
사용되지 않았다. 본 논문은 스위스의 정치 제도 내에서 증가하고 있는 양극화가 어떻
게 국민운동을 잠재적인 불안요소로 만드는지 살펴보고 국민주권과 국제법 간의 쉽지 
않은 과제를 해결하기 위한 노력에 관해 분석하였다. 
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